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Abstract
We present and analyze a model for the evolution of the wealth distribution
within a heterogeneous economic environment. The model considers a system of
rational agents interacting in a game theoretical framework, through fairly general
assumptions on the cost function. This evolution drives the dynamic of the agents
in both wealth and economic configuration variables. We consider a regime of scale
separation where the large scale dynamics is given by a hydrodynamic closure with
a Nash equilibrium serving as the local thermodynamic equilibrium. The result is
a system of gas dynamics-type equations for the density and average wealth of the
agents on large scales. We recover the inverse gamma distribution as an equilib-
rium in the particular case of quadratic cost functions which has been previously
considered in the literature.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the evolution of wealth in economy. More precisely, we wish
to model the large time-scale evolution of the distribution of wealth when the ensemble
of agents presents some large-scale heterogeneities arising e.g. from geographic or social
differences. This evolution will be driven by Nash equilibria within the framework set up
by [12], which is closely related to Mean-Field Games [8, 18].
The subject of understanding the wealth distribution has a long history since Pareto
in 1896 [27]. The wealth distribution results from the combination of two important
mechanisms: the first one is the geometric Brownian motion of finance which has first
been proposed by Bachelier in 1900 [2] and the second one is the trading model, one the
earlier ones being that of Edgeworth, dating back to 1881 [14]. These pioneering works
have been followed by numerous authors and have given rise to the field of econophysics.
Recent references on this problem can be found e.g. in the books [9, 24, 32, 33] and e.g.
in the references [20, 31, 34, 36].
We consider an economy modeled as a closed ensemble of agents. The state of each
agent is described by two variables. The variable x, describes its location in the economic
configuration space, as for instance the propensity of an agent to invest [13]. Therefore,
there is a notion of proximity between agents which makes economic interaction (trading)
more likely. In addition, the state is described by the wealth y of the agent. The dynamic
of these attributes is given by some motion mechanism in the economic configuration
variable x and by the exchange of wealth (trading) in the wealth variable y.
The basic equation considered in this paper is of the form
∂tf(x, y, t) + ∂x(f V (x, y)) = ∂y(f ∂yΦf ) + d ∂
2
y(y
2f), (1.1)
where f(x, y, t) is the density of agents in economic configuration space x having wealth y
at time t. In the absence of the economic configuration variable x, it reduces to a model
originally proposed by Bouchaud and Me´zard [7] (see also [10]), namely
∂tf(y, t) = ∂y(f ∂yΦf ) + d ∂
2
y(y
2f). (1.2)
In this model, Φf is an interaction ‘potential’, which in the mean-field theory, is func-
tionally dependent on the density f(x, y, t). In [7], it describes the resultant of pairwise
interactions proportional to the quadratic distance between the wealth of the two agents.
The goal of the present paper is to extend this framework to general potentials. The
second term at the right hand side of (1.2) models the uncertainty and has the form of
a diffusion operator corresponding to the geometric Brownian motion of economy and
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finance, with variance 2dy2 quadratic in y. The justification of this operator can be found
in [26]. In this model, the total wealth
∫∞
0
yf(y, t) dy is preserved. This case is referred
to as a “conservative economy”. The Bouchaud and Me´zard model [7] can be recovered
in the small exchange of wealth limit from the Boltzmann like model of [10].
In [13], Du¨ring & Toscani have introduced an economic configuration variable x to the
model of [7, 10] and considered Eq. (1.1) in the case of a quadratic potential. In their
work, the x variable is a propensity to trade. In [13] as well as in the present model,
the position in economic configuration affects the trading behavior of the agent through
the dependence of Φf upon x. Conversely, the evolution of the agents’ wealth y triggers
some movement in the economic configuration variable x. This evolution is modeled by
the quantity V (x, y) which describes how fast the agents move in configuration space (i.e.
is the ‘velocity’ in economic configuration). The dependence of V upon both economic
configuration x and wealth y expresses that the evolution of the agents in these two
variables are coupled.
In [13], the first two moments of the wealth distribution function f are considered.
These moments are the density of agents ρ(x, t) and the density of wealth ρΥ(x, t) defined
by:
ρ(x, t) =
∫
f(x, y, t) dy, ρΥ(x, t) =
∫
yf(x, y, t) dy , (1.3)
(where Υ is the mean wealth) and are functions of the economic configuration x and the
time t. Taking the moments of (1.1) and closing the resulting moment system by using
the equilibrium distribution of [7, 10], they find a system of conservation equations for ρ
and ρY in configuration space x and time t, which resembles the gas dynamics equations.
The first goal of the present paper is to propose an extension of [7, 10, 13] by con-
sidering arbitrary potentials (and not only quadratic ones). We find that the equilibria
cannot be given explicitly, by contrast to the previous literature where they could be
expresed in terms of an inverse gamma distribution. Rather, they are found through the
resolution of a fixed point equation. If multiple solutions to this fixed point equation
exist, corresponding to multiple stable equilibria, this indicates that phase transitions in
the wealth distribution are possible. However, we leave the question of the existence and
enumeration of the solutions to the fixed point equation to future work.
The second goal of the paper is to derive the moment equations which provide the
dynamics of ρ and ρY in configuration space x and time t, using the equilibria found
from the resolution of the above mentioned fixed point problem. This is done in the
same way as in [13] except for the following differences. First, the conditions of scale
separation where this derivation is justified are stated explictly. Second, we give a proof
that the density and wealth density are the only quantities which are preserved by the
interaction. In kinetic theoretical terms, this means that the only ‘collision invariants’
are linear combinations of 1 and y. This result is rigorously proved here in the case of a
quadratic potential considered before [7, 10, 13]. The proof relies on a Poincare´ inequality
which follows from [3, 4]. At this point, it is only a conjecture in the case of a general
potential.
The third goal of this paper is to relate the setting of [7, 10, 13] to game theory. In
the present work, the potential can be viewed as the cost function in a non-atomic non-
cooperative anonymous game with a continuum of players [1, 21, 29, 30], also known as a
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Mean-Field Game [8, 18]. This cost function arises from the sum of pairwise interactions.
For each pair of players, the equilibrium reached under this interaction corresponds to
wealth difference being at one of the mimima of this cost function. We note that this
model only considers the exchange of money and does not keep track of the goods and
services traded. Therefore, this game does not mean that each players wishes to share
some of its wealth with the trading partner. Rather, the utility of the exchange is to
maximize the economic action resulting in the optimal exchange of goods and services.
Within this framework, the dynamic of agents following these strategies can be viewed as
given by the following game: each agent follows what is known as the best-reply strategy,
that is tries to minimize the cost function with respect to its wealth variable, assuming
that the other agents do not change theirs. In order to do so, each player moves in the y
direction along the negative gradient of the cost function Φf .
The passage to the macroscopic scale is done by assuming that the spatio-temporal
scale of the economic interaction (the dynamic in the y-direction) is fast compared to
the spatio-temporal scale of the motion in the economic configuration space (i.e. the x
variable). The analysis of such scale separation problems is usually done by re-scaling
t → t
ε
, x → x
ε
, while leaving y unchanged where ε ≪ 1 is a small parameter charac-
terizing the ratio of the microscopic units to the macroscopic ones. Typically, here, the
microscopic time unit is the inverse of the trading frequency, while the macroscopic one
is the characteristic time of the evolution in the economic configuration space. Similar
considerations would hold for the spatial units.
This rescaling yields the following perturbation problem:
ε
(
∂tf(x, y, t) + ∂x(f V (x, y))
)
= Q(f), (1.4)
with the operator Q(f) given by
Q(f)(y) = ∂y(f ∂yΦ¯f ) + d ∂
2
y(y
2f), (1.5)
where Φ¯f is a localized version of the cost function Φf . The localized cost function Φ¯f is
such that its evaluation at a given point (x, t) only depends on the values of f at the same
point. This localization is obtained under the assumption of scale-separation, i.e. that
trading interactions are much more likely within agents belonging to the same economic
neighborhood x at a given time t. For this reason, we will denote it by Φ¯ρ(x,t),νx,t(y), where
ρ(x, t) =
∫
y∈R+
f(x, y, t) dy, νx,t(y) =
1
ρ(x, t)
f(x, y, t).
respectively denote the local density of agents at (x, t) and the conditional probability of
presence of the agents, conditioned on fixing (x, t). Writing Φ¯ = Φ¯ρ(x,t),νx,t(y) expresses
that Φ¯ evaluated at (x, t) depends on the scalar quantity ρ(x, t) and is functionally de-
pendent on the probability νx,t.
In the limit ε → 0, one is led to look for the solutions of Q(f) = 0. These solutions,
known as the local equilibria, provide the formal limit of the solution f ε to (1.4) when
ε → 0. Along with the interpretation given in [12], we show that these local equilibria
can be interpreted as Nash equilibria of the mean-field game defined above. So, Eq. (1.1)
can be interpreted as the mean field limit of a system of agents whose dynamic in the
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wealth variable y is driven by the best-reply strategy, i.e. is a march towards the Nash
equilibrium along the gradient of the cost function. This motion is supplemented with
the standard geometric Brownian motion of economy and finance.
The Nash equilibria can be expressed in the form of Gibbs distributions MΞ(y):
MΞ(y) =
1
ZΞ
exp
(− Ξ(y)
d
)
, ZΞ =
∫
y∈R+
exp
(− Ξ(y)
d
)
dy. (1.6)
where the function Ξ(y) is associated to the cost function Φ¯ρ,ν . For MΞ to be a local equi-
librium, Ξ must satisfy a fixed point equation expressing the Nash equilibrium property.
Since Φ¯ρ(x,t),νx,t depend locally on (x, t), so do the function Ξ = Ξx,t(y). The importance
of the Gibbs distribution in the statistical physics of money and wealth is reviewed in [36].
The large scale limit i.e. the limit ε → 0 after rescaling t → t
ε
, x → x
ε
yields
the gas-dynamic type system of evolution equations for the macroscopic quantities (the
moments), i.e. for the local density ρ(x, t) and average wealth Υ(x, t) defined at (1.3).
The macroscopic equations are of the form
∂tρ(x, t) + ∂x(ρ u(x; Ξx,t)) = 0, (1.7)
∂t(ρΥ)(x, t) + ∂x(ρE(x; Ξx,t)) = 0 . (1.8)
Here the macroscopic velocity u(x; Ξx,t) and wealth velocity E(x; Ξx,t) are functions of x
and are functionally dependent on Ξx,t. They are computed via closure of the moments
of equation (1.1) using the Nash equilibrium (1.6) as a closure. For the case of a general
trading interaction potential, it is not known wheter system (1.7), (1.8) forms a closed
system of equations, i.e. in other words, if the knowledge of ρ and Υ suffices to reconstruct
Ξ in a unique way. This point is left to future work.
However, in the case of a quadratic trading interaction [7, 10, 13], it can be shown that
it is actually the case and we can write u(x; Ξx,t) = u(x; Υ(x, t)), E(x; Ξx,t) = E(x; Υ(x, t)),
which makes system (1.7), (1.8) a closed system of equations. Under suitable assumptions
on u and E , it can be shown that this system is hyperbolic. Therefore, it is (at least locally
in time) well-posed and shares similar features as the classical system of compressible gas
dynamics equations. This system has already been proposed in [13]. However, we prove
that the conservation of density and wealth density are the only conserved quantities.
The proof of this fact relies on a Poincare´ inequality which can be derived from [3, 4].
This is an important step towards the rigorous proof of the convergence of the solutions
of (1.4) to those of (1.7), (1.8) in the ε→ 0 limit.
We now give a few examples of potential applications of the present work, beyond the
case considered in [13], where x has the meaning of a propensity to trade. In the first
example, the economic configuration variable x coincides with the geographical position x.
Here for instance, we are considering different countries, or different areas of the same
country, which have different wealth distributions. It is a documented fact [17, 22] that
spatial inhomogenities of the wealth distribution trigger migrations, people from areas
where the lower range of the wealth distributions is thick tending to migrate towards areas
where the higher range of the wealth distribution is more populated. Obviously, in return,
these migrations affect the shape of the wealth distribution in the concerned areas. In this
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context, the model can be used to provide a spatially continuous description of wealth
distribution inhomogeneities and of their evolution in the large time due to migrations.
The second example has to do with the connection between wealth and social status
which has been studied in e.g. [11, 28, 35]. Social status has an obvious relation to
wealth. However, this relation may not be straightforward, as social status may also be
influenced by other factors such as professional or marital status and power. Obviously, a
higher social status increases the opportunities to make money and conversely, money may
buy some factors which influence social status. Therefore, it is interesting to study how
differences between wealth distributions in different social strata may trigger movement
of agents between these strata in the long term and how, in return, these movements
influence the wealth distribution in each strata.
Lastly, the third example pertains to the connection between wealth and education
or cultural level. Studies about this connection can be found e.g. in [15, 16]. This is
very similar to the previous example as a higher education or cultural level increases the
opportunities for a high trading activity. Conversely, an increased wealth due to a higher
economic activity provides the resources and incentives for training and participation in
cultural activities. Therefore, like in the previous examples, our methodology could be
used to study the long term evolution of the distribution of education or cultural level due
to inhomogeneities in the wealth distribution among the various cultural or educational
strata.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the multi-agent model for
the dynamics of N agents. We assume the existence of a mean field limit for N → ∞,
yielding formally the Fokker-Planck equation (1.1) for the effective single agent density
f(x, y, t). Section 3 is devoted to the spatially homogeneous case, where f is independent
of the economic configuration variable x. Its main purpose is to provide the fixed point
equation whose resolution yields the equilibrium distribution of Q in (1.5). We show that
the equilibrium distribution is actually a Nash equilibrium, i.e. no player can improve
on the cost function by choosing a different direction in y. In Section 4 we consider
the inhomogeneous case and close the moments of the kinetic equation (1.1) using the
equilibrium density from Section 3. Finally, we conclude by drawing some perspectives in
section 5.
2 The model and its mean-field limit
2.1 A dynamic agent model for wealth distribution
We consider a set of N market agents. Each agent, labeled j, is endowed with two
variables: its wealth Yj ∈ R+ and a variable Xj ∈ R which characterizes its economic
configuration, i.e. the category of agents it ususally interacts with. We ignore the possi-
bility of debts so that we take Yj ≥ 0.
The dynamics of the agents is an elaboration of a model proposed in [7]. It is written:
X˙j = V (Xj(t), Yj(t)), (2.1)
dYj = − 1
N
∑
k 6=j
ξjkΨ(|Xj −Xk|) ∂Y φ(Yj − Yk) dt+
√
2d Yj dB
j
t . (2.2)
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The first term at the right-hand side of (2.2) describes economic interactions such as
trading. A huge diversity of trading models have been proposed since the pioneering
work [14] (see e.g. [31]). Here, we consider a slightly generalized form of the Bouchaud
and Me´zart trading model [7]. The quantity φ is a trading interaction potential which
describes how the trading activity depends on the difference of wealth between the trading
agents. In [7], the trading activity is proportional to the difference of wealth, which means
that φ is a quadratic function. This simple assumption is convenient as it gives rise to
explicit formulae for the equilibria (see below). However, in the perspective of making
this theory more quantitative, it is desirable to investigate more general forms of trading
interactions. Here, at this point, we make no assumption on the form of the trading
interaction φ. The weight ξjkΨ(|Xj −Xk|) is the trading frequency between agents j and
k and depends on the distance in economic configuration space between the two agents.
We assume that ξjk is symmetric: ξjk = ξkj and that Ψ is normalized:∫
x∈R
Ψ(|x|) dx = 1. (2.3)
The second term at the right-hand side of (2.2) is the classical geometric Brownian motion
of finance, which has first been proposed by Bachelier in 1900 [2]. The quantity
√
2d is
the volatility while the notation Bjt denote independent Brownian motions. Eq. (2.1)
describes how fast the agent evolves in the economic configuration space as a function
of its current wealth and current economic configuration and V (x, y) is a measure of the
speed of this motion.
In this paper, we make the following important assumption:
Assumption 2.1 The function Y ∈ R→ φ(Y ) ∈ R is C2 and even.
Under this assumption, the first term of (2.2) conserves the total wealth. Indeed, the
rates of evolution of the wealth of agent j in its interaction with agent k and conversely,
of agent k in its interaction with agent j are opposite and add up to zero. The stochastic
differential equation (2.2) should be understood in the Ito` sense. This is a difference with
[7] where the Stratonovich sense was used. However, upon a simple conversion involving
the addition of a term Yj d dt, the models are the same in the case of a quadratic trading
interaction potential φ. In this case, Eq. (2.2) is homogeneous of degree one with respect
to the variable Yj, which means that the unit of wealth in this case can be arbitrary.
However, this homogeneity is lost for a more general trading interaction potential, and
later on, we will have to choose a unit of wealth (such as a given monetary unit).
In this work, we assume that the trading frequency ξjk is a function of the number of
trading agents in the economic neighbourhoods of j and k. For instance, we can take
ξjk = ξ
(ρΨj + ρΨk
2
)
where
ρΨj =
1
N
∑
ℓ6=j
Ψ(|Xℓ −Xj|).
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For the simplicity of notations, we have assumed that the ’counting function’ Ψ is the
same as in (2.2) but this restriction in unessential.
We introduce the notations ~X(t) = (X1, . . . , XN ), ~Y (t) = (Y1, . . . , YN) and Yˆj =
(Y1, . . . , Yj−1, Yj+1, . . . , YN) (note that in game theory, Yˆj is often denoted Y−j). We also
write ~Y = (Yj, Yˆj) by abuse of notation. Eq. (2.2) can be recast in the following form:
dYj = −∂YjΦN( ~X, Yj , Yˆj, t) dt+
√
2d Yj dB
j
t . (2.4)
where the cost function ΦN( ~X, ~Y , t) is given by
ΦN( ~X, ~Y , t) =
1
N
∑
k 6=j
ξjk( ~X)Ψ(|Xj −Xk|)φ(Yk − Yj), (2.5)
with
ξjk( ~X) = ξ
(ρΨj ( ~X) + ρΨk ( ~X)
2
)
, ρΨj ( ~X) =
1
N
∑
ℓ6=j
Ψ(|Xℓ −Xj|).
Therefore, the agents choose the steepest descent direction of their cost function Yj →
ΦN( ~X, Yj, Yˆj) as their action in wealth space. This action is supplemented with a geo-
metric Brownian noise which models volatility. Ignoring these additional effects due to
the environment, the agents would eventually, at large times, reach a point of minimum
of their cost function. This minimum would then be written
Y Nj (
~X, Yˆj, t) = arg min
Yj∈R+
ΦN( ~X, Yj, Yˆj , t), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (2.6)
and corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the agents. Therefore, the dynamics correspond
to a non-cooperative non-atomic anonymous game [1, 21, 29, 30], also known as a Mean-
Field Game [8, 18], where the equilibrium assumption is replaced by a time dynamics
describing the march towards a Nash equilibrium. However, the cost function depends
on the position of the agent in economic configuration space and reciprocally, the motion
of the agents in economic configuration space depends on their wealth. Consequently,
this march towards a local Nash equilibrium may be perturbed by the motion of the
agents in economic configuration space. The goal of this paper is to study the large scale
dynamics of this system by establishing macrocopic equations in economic configuration
space, particularly in the case where the potential is not quadratic (the quadratic case
being treated in [13]). To this aim, we consider a continuous version of this discrete
system.
2.2 Mean-Field limit
We introduce the N -particle empirical distribution function
fN(x, y, t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXj(t)(x)⊗ δYj(t)(y),
and regard fN as a map from t ∈ R+ to fN(t) ∈ P(R× R+), where P(R× R+) denotes
the set of probability measures on R× R+. We now make the following assumptions:
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Assumption 2.2 In the mean-field limit N → ∞ of the number of agents going to
infinity, there exists a one-particle distribution function f = f(x, y, t), which maps t ∈ R+
to f(t) ∈ Pac(R×R+) where Pac(R×R+) is the space of probability measures on (R×R+)
which are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on (R × R+), such
that
fN ⇀ f, when N →∞, (2.7)
in the weak star topology of bounded measures.
We also assume that a mean-field cost function exists:
Assumption 2.3 We assume that there exists a map Pac(R × R+) → C2(R × R+),
f 7→ Φf , such that, for all trajectories (Xj(t), Yj(t)) satisfying (2.7) and (X(t), Y (t)) such
that (Xj(t), Yj(t))→ (X(t), Y (t)) when N →∞, we have
ΦN
(
Xj(t), Xˆj(t), Yj(t), Yˆj(t), t
)→ Φf(t)(X(t), Y (t)), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀t ≥ 0. (2.8)
Under Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3, and owing to (2.5), Φf(t) is given by:
Φf(t)(x, y) =
∫
(x′,y′)∈R×R+
ξ
(ρΨ(x, t) + ρΨ(x′, t)
2
)
Ψ(|x′ − x|)
φ(y′ − y) f(x′, y′, t) dx′ dy′, (2.9)
with
ρΨ(x, t) =
∫
(x′,y′)∈R×R+
Ψ(|x− x′|) f(x′, y′, t) dx′ dy′.
Then, in the limit N → ∞, the one-particle distribution function f is a solution of the
following Fokker-Planck equation [7]:
∂tf + ∂x(V (x, y)f) + ∂y(Ff f) = d ∂
2
y
(
y2f
)
, (2.10)
where Ff = Ff (x, y, t) is given by
Ff (x, y, t) = −∂yΦf(t)(x, y). (2.11)
For short, we will write Φf(t) = Φf . Thanks to (2.9), Ff can be written:
Ff (x, y, t) = −
∫
(x′,y′)∈R×R+
ξ
(ρΨ(x, t) + ρΨ(x′, t)
2
)
Ψ(|x− x′|)
∂yφ(y − y′) f(x′, y′, t) dx′ dy′. (2.12)
We supplement this equation with the boundary condition
f(x, 0, t) = 0, ∀x ∈ R, ∀t ∈ R+. (2.13)
We also provide an initial condition f(x, y, 0) = f0(x, y).
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2.3 Macroscopic scaling
In order to manage the various scales in a proper way, we first change the variables
to dimensionless ones. We introduce t0 and x0 = at0 the time and economic configu-
ration space units, with a the typical magnitude of V . We scale the wealth variable
y, by a monetary unit y0. We choose t0 in such a way that the magnitude of Ψ and
d are O(1). Introducing x˜ = x/x0, t˜ = t/t0, y˜ = y/y0, f˜(x˜, y˜, t˜) = x0 y0 f(x, y, t),
V˜ (x˜, y˜) = V (x, y)/a, Ψ˜(|x˜− x˜′|) = x0Ψ(|x−x′|), ρ˜Ψ˜(x˜, t˜) = x0ρΨ(x, t), ξ˜(ρ˜) = ξ(ρ)/(ay20),
F˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜) = (t0/y0)Ff (x, y, t), Φ˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜) = (t0/y
2
0)Φf (x, y, t), φ˜(y˜) = φ(y), d˜ = dt0, Eq.
(2.10) is written:
∂t˜f˜ + ∂x˜(V˜ (x˜, y˜)f˜) + ∂y˜(F˜f˜ f˜) = d˜ ∂
2
y˜
(
y˜2f˜
)
, (2.14)
with F˜f˜ given by
F˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜) = −∂y˜Φ˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜), (2.15)
and
Φ˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜) =
=
∫
(x˜′,y˜′)∈R×R+
ξ˜
( ρ˜Ψ˜(x˜, t˜) + ρ˜Ψ˜(x˜′, t˜)
2
)
Ψ˜(|x˜− x˜′|)φ(y˜ − y˜′) f˜(x˜′, y˜′, t˜) dx˜′ dy˜′, (2.16)
ρ˜Ψ˜(x˜, t˜) =
∫
(x˜′,y˜′)∈R×R+
Ψ˜(|x˜− x˜′|) f˜(x˜′, y˜′, t˜) dx˜′ dy˜′. (2.17)
We note that Ψ˜ still satisfies the normalization condition (2.3).
Following the procedure developed in [12], we introduce the macroscopic scale. We
assume that the changes in economic configuration x are slow compared to the exchanges
of wealth between agents. Therefore, we change the units of economic configuration
space and time to new ones x′0 = x0/ε, t
′
0 = t0/ε with ε ≪ 1. The parameter ε is
the ratio of the typical time between two economic interactions (which is very short)
compared to the time-scale of the evolution of the economic configuration variable (which
is large). Therefore, we change the space and time variables to macroscopic variables
xˆ = εx˜, tˆ = εt˜ and define fˆ(xˆ, y˜, tˆ) = ε−1f˜(x˜, y˜, t˜). We note that, as usual in kinetic
theory, we do not scale the variable y˜. In this change of scale, the integral (2.17) becomes∫
Ψ˜( |xˆ−xˆ
′|
ε
) fˆ(xˆ′, y˜′, tˆ) dxˆ′ dy˜′ = O(ε). Therefore, we rescale the density ρ˜Ψ˜ to take into
account this behavior and let ρˆΨ˜(xˆ, tˆ) = ε−1ρ˜Ψ˜(x˜, t˜). We scale the velocity, cost function
and force to unity i.e. we let Vˆ (xˆ, y˜) = V˜ (x˜, y˜), Fˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ) = F˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜), Φˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ) =
Φ˜f˜ (x˜, y˜, t˜).
Similar to (2.17), in this rescaling, the integral in (2.16) is O(ε). To compensate
for it, we assume that ξ˜ is large, which maintains the trading frequency of order unity.
Therefore, we let ξˆ(ρˆ) = εξ˜(ρ˜). The resulting expression of the force term is
Fˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ) = −∂y˜Φˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ), (2.18)
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with
Φˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ) =
=
∫
(xˆ′,y˜′)∈R×R+
ξˆ
( ρˆΨ˜(xˆ, t) + ρˆΨ˜(xˆ′, t)
2
) 1
ε
Ψ˜
( |xˆ− xˆ′|
ε
)
φ˜(y˜ − y˜′) fˆ(xˆ′, y˜′, tˆ) dxˆ′ dy˜′, (2.19)
ρˆΨ˜(xˆ, tˆ) =
∫
(xˆ′,y˜′)∈R×R+
1
ε
Ψ˜
( |xˆ− xˆ′|
ε
)
fˆ(xˆ′, y˜′, tˆ) dxˆ′ dy˜′. (2.20)
Inserting these changes of variables and unknowns into (2.14) and using (2.18), we finally
obtain the following perturbation problem:
ε
(
∂tˆfˆ + ∂xˆ(Vˆ (xˆ, y˜)fˆ)
)
+ ∂y˜(Fˆfˆ fˆ) = d˜ ∂
2
y˜
(
y˜2fˆ
)
. (2.21)
Now, by Taylor expansion in (2.19) and (2.20), and using the normalization condition
(2.3), we get, assuming that fˆ varies only at the large scale:
Φˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ) = ξ(ρˆ(xˆ, tˆ))
∫
y˜′∈R+
φ˜(y˜ − y˜′) fˆ(xˆ, y˜′, tˆ) dy˜′ +O(ε2). (2.22)
Here, we introduce the local density ρˆ(xˆ, tˆ) of agents having economic configuration xˆ at
time tˆ, νxˆ,tˆ(y˜) the conditional probability derived from the probability density fˆ(tˆ) by
conditioning on the economic configuration variable being equal to xˆ, by:
νxˆ,tˆ(y˜) =
1
ρˆ(xˆ, tˆ)
fˆ(xˆ, y˜, tˆ), ρˆ(xˆ, tˆ) =
∫
y˜∈R+
f(xˆ, y˜, tˆ) dy˜, (2.23)
We assume that νxˆ,tˆ ∈ Pac(R+), the space of absolutely continuous probability measures
on R+. With these notations, (2.22) can be written:
Φˆfˆ (xˆ, y˜, tˆ) = Φ¯ρˆ(xˆ,tˆ),νxˆ,tˆ(y˜) +O(ε
2), (2.24)
where the functional Φ¯: (ρˆ, ν) ∈ R+ × Pac(R+)→ Φ¯ρˆ,ν ∈ C2(R+) is defined as follows:
Φ¯ρˆ,ν(y˜) = ρˆ ξˆ(ρˆ)
∫
y˜′∈R+
φ˜(y˜ − y˜′) ν(y˜′) dy˜′, (2.25)
Eqs. (2.24), (2.25) state that, up to factors of order O(ε2), the cost function is a
functional of the conditional probability νxˆ,tˆ and of the density ρˆ(xˆ, tˆ) only, and therefore,
only depends on local quantities in the economic configuration variable xˆ. The O(ε2)
term collects all non-local effects in economic configuration. These effects are supposed
to be much smaller than the local ones. This is an expression of the scale separation in
economic configuration: local effects in the economic configuration variable are supposed
to have a much bigger influence than non-local ones on a given agent. We comment the
relevance of this assumption in the three examples discussed in the introduction.
In the first example, concerning the influence of migration on the wealth distribution,
local trading may be viewed as much more important than long-distance ones, especially
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when services are concerned. Also, the time-scale of trading is much faster than the time-
scale of demographic changes due to migration. Therefore, the time-scale separation is
also justified. In the second and third example pertaining with the coupled evolution of
wealth and social status on the one hand and wealth and education level on the other
hand, similar observations can be made. Wealth exchanges are more likely to be important
with a given social status or education level than outside them. A similar observation
can be made for the time-scale of trading which is much faster than the time-scales of
social status or education level changes. Of course, it is difficult to quantify the amount
of ‘locality’ of the wealth exchanges within a social network. Precisely, the present model
can actually help testing such hypotheses by providing a coarse-grained description of the
system which could be more easily compared to actual data.
Keeping only the leading order term of (2.24) inside (2.21), (2.18), we are finally led
to the following perturbation problem (where we drop all ’hats’, ’tildes’ and ’bars’):
ε
(
∂tf
ε + ∂x(V (x, y)f
ε)
)
= −∂y(Ffε f ε) + d ∂2y
(
y2f ε
)
, (2.26)
Ff (x, y, t) = −∂yΦρ(x,t),νx,t , (2.27)
Φρ,ν(y) = ρ ξ(ρ)
∫
y′∈R+
φ(y − y′) ν(y′) dy′, (2.28)
νx,t(y) =
1
ρ(x, t)
f(x, y, t), (2.29)
ρ(x, t) =
∫
y∈R+
f(x, y, t) dy. (2.30)
The goal is to derive the limit ε→ 0 of this problem. For this purpose, we first consider
the homogeneous economic configuration case in the section below.
3 The homogeneous configuration case
3.1 The collision operator Q
Here, we assume that the wealth dynamics is independent of the position in economic
configuration space and we restrict the system to the wealth variable y only. Then, f
becomes a mapping from t ∈ [0,∞[ to f(t) ∈ L1(R+). Obviously, the density
ρ =
∫
y∈R+
f(y, t) dy, (3.1)
is conserved, i.e. ρ is independent of t. Consequently, the trading frequency ρξ(ρ) is a
constant which will be denoted by κ. Dividing Eq. (2.26) by the constant ρ, we can write
it as an equation for the probability density ν = νt =
f(·,t)
ρ
as follows:
∂tν = Q(ν), (3.2)
Q(ν) = −∂y(Fν ν) + d ∂2y
(
y2ν
)
, (3.3)
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where Fν is given by
Fν(y) = −∂yΦν(y), (3.4)
Φν(y) = κ
∫
y′∈R+
φ(y − y′) ν(y′) dy′, (3.5)
and with initial condition given by ν0. We have omitted the dependence of Φ upon ρ,
since now ρ is a constant. By analogy with classical kinetic theory of gases, we refer to
Q as the ‘collision operator’.
We now introduce different expressions and a functional setting for Q. We start with
some definitions.
Definition 3.1 We define Ξν and µν: ν ∈ Pac(R+) 7→ Ξν , µν ∈ C2(R+) such that:
∂yΞν(y) =
1
y2
∂yΦν(y) +
2d
y
, (3.6)
µν(y) = Ξν(y) + d ln ν, (3.7)
The function Ξν will be referred to as the ’twisted cost function’ and takes into account
the geometric effect of the Brownian noise. The function µν(y) will be referred to as
the ’augmented cost function’. It takes the previous twisted cost function and adds the
contribution of the diffusion.
We now introduce the Gibbs equilibria, which will appear as the equilibria of Q. We note
that the importance of the Gibbs equilibria in economics and finance is reviewed in [36].
Definition 3.2 For any given cost function Ξ(y), we introduce the ’Gibbs measure’MΞ(y)
associated to Ξ by:
MΞ(y) =
1
ZΞ
exp
(− Ξ(y)
d
)
, ZΞ =
∫
y∈R+
exp
(− Ξ(y)
d
)
dy. (3.8)
Remark 3.1 (i) The definition of ZΞ is such that MΞ is a probability density, i.e. it
satisfies ∫
y∈R+
MΞ(y) dy = 1. (3.9)
Now, using the definitions above, we can recast Q into various forms below. First, intro-
duce the following definition.
Definition 3.3 To any twisted cost function Ξ ∈ C2(R+), we associate the linear collision
operator QΞ defined by the following equivalent expressions:
QΞ(ν)(y) = ∂y
(
y2
(
∂yΞ(y) ν(y) + d∂yν(y)
) )
, (3.10)
= ∂y
(
y2 ∂yµ(y) ν(y)
)
. (3.11)
= d ∂y
(
y2MΞ(y) ∂y
( ν(y)
MΞ(y)
))
, (3.12)
with µ = Ξ + d ln ν.
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Then, we have the following lemma, the proof of which is obvious:
Lemma 3.4 The operator Q given by (3.3) has the following expressions:
Q(ν)(y) = QΞν (ν). (3.13)
where the twisted cost function Ξν is defined by (3.6).
In the next section, we study the properties of Q in more detail. More specifically, we
are interested in the equilibria (i.e. the solutions of Q(ν) = 0) and the collision invariants
(i.e. the functions ψ(y) which cancel Q(f) upon integration with respect to y). These
two concepts are key to the derivation of the macroscopic equations.
3.2 Properties of Q
We introduce a weak form of the operator Q. For this purpose, we define the following
functional spaces. Let Ξ ∈ C2(R+) be a given twisted cost function. Define
XΞ =
{
u such that
∫
y∈R+
|u(y)|2MΞ(y) dy
y2
<∞
}
,
HΞ =
{
u such that
∫
y∈R+
(|u(y)|2 + |y2 ∂yu(y)|2)MΞ(y) dy
y2
<∞
}
,
endowed with the associated norms ‖u‖XΞ , and ‖u‖HΞ . We also define
HΞ0 = {u ∈ HΞ such that
∫
y∈R+
u(y)MΞ(y)
dy
y2
= 0}.
The spaces XΞ and HΞ are respectively L2 and H1 type spaces associated to the measure
MΞ(y)
dy
y2
and the space HΞ0 is similar to an H1 space of functions having zero mean
with respect to this measure. Therefore, we can expect that a Poincare´ inequality holds,
provided suitable assumptions on Ξ are made.
At this point, we will assume that such a Poincare´ inequality holds. In section 3.4
below, we will prove this Poincare´ inequality for quadratic trading interactions (the setting
of [7]).
Assumption 3.1 We assume that the function Ξ: y ∈ R+ 7→ Ξ(y) ∈ R is such that
Ξ ∈ C2(R+) and that there exists a constant C > 0 with
|u|HΞ =
∫
y∈R+
|y ∂yu(y)|2MΞ(y) dy ≥ C‖u‖HΞ , ∀u ∈ HΞ0. (3.14)
This Poincare´ inequality equivalently states that the semi-norm |u|HΞ is a norm on HΞ0
which is equivalent to the norm ‖u‖HΞ . The following lemma gives some properties of the
linear operator QΞ.
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Lemma 3.5 We suppose that Ξ ∈ C2(R+) is given and satisfies Assumption 3.1.
(i) The weak form of the problem:
“Let g be given; find f such that: QΞ(f) = g”, (3.15)
where f and g are sufficiently smooth functions on R+ is given by:
“Let ψ ∈ XΞ be given; find ϕ ∈ HΞ such that:∫
y∈R+
∂yϕ(y) ∂yσ(y) y
2MΞ(y) dy = −
∫
y∈R+
ψ σ(y)MΞ(y) dy, ∀σ ∈ HΞ”, (3.16)
where
f = MΞ ϕ, g = MΞ ψ. (3.17)
(ii) If ψ = 0, the solution space for this problem is spanned by the constants. In terms of
f , the solution space is the one-dimensional linear space spanned by MΞ.
(iii) If ψ 6= 0, problem (3.16) admits a solution if and only if
∫
y∈R+
ψ(y)MΞ(y) dy = 0. (3.18)
If (3.18) is satisfied, there exists a unique solution ϕ0 ∈ HΞ0 and the solution space is the
one-dimensional affine space of functions of the form ϕ0 + Constant. In terms of g, the
solvability condition (3.18) is written
∫
y∈R+
g(y) dy = 0, (3.19)
and the solution space is the one-dimensional affine space of functions of the form (ϕ0 +
C)MΞ where C ∈ R is an arbitrary constant.
The proof is deferred to the appendix A
Now, for a given twisted cost function Ξ, we investigate the equilibria of the linear
operator QΞ defined at (3.13).
Definition 3.6 The equilibria of QΞ are the weak solutions ν ∈ Pac(R+) of
QΞ(ν) = 0. (3.20)
i.e. are the functions ν ∈ Pac(R+) such that θ = νMΞ belongs to HΞ and satisfies∫
y∈R+
∂yθ(y) ∂yσ(y) y
2MΞ(y) dy = 0, ∀σ ∈ HΞ. (3.21)
We deduce the following:
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Proposition 3.7 We suppose that Ξ is given and satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then ν is
an equilibrium of QΞ if and only if ν = MΞ where MΞ is given by (3.8).
Proof. Let ν be an equilibrium of QΞ or equivalently let θ = νMΞ ∈ HΞ be a weak
solution of (3.21). By Lemma 3.5 (ii), the unique solutions are θ = Constant. Hence,
by the normalization condition (3.1), the unique weak solution ν of (3.20) in Pac(R+)
is f = MΞ.
We now turn towards defining the equilibria of the nonlinear operator Q(ν) = QΞν (ν),
where Ξν is related to ν through (3.6). We define:
Definition 3.8 The equilibria of Q are the weak solutions ν ∈ Pac(R+) of
Q(ν) = QΞν (ν) = 0, (3.22)
where Ξν is related to ν through (3.6). These equilibria are the functions ν ∈ Pac(R+)
such that θ = ν
MΞν
belongs to HΞν and satisfies∫
y∈R+
∂yθ(y) ∂yσ(y) y
2MΞν (y) dy = 0, ∀σ ∈ HΞν . (3.23)
The equilibria of Q are given in the next:
Proposition 3.9 ν is an equilibrium of Q if and only if ν is a solution of the fixed point
problem
ν = MΞν . (3.24)
Proof. If ν is an equilibrium of Q, it is an equilibrium of QΞ for a certain twisted cost
function Ξ, namely Ξ = Ξν . Then, from Prop. 3.7, it is of the form ν = MΞν . Reciprocally,
if ν satisfies (3.24), ν is an equilibrium of QΞν and so, satisfies QΞν (ν) = 0. But, because
of (3.13), we have Q(ν) = 0 and ν is therefore an equilibrium.
Remark 3.2 In statistical physics, the equilibria are called the Thermodynamic Equilib-
ria.
The fixed point equation (3.24) can be equivalently stated as a fixed point equation for
the twisted cost function Ξ. This equivalence is established in the following proposition,
the proof of which is obvious.
Proposition 3.10 ν is an equilibrium of Q if and only if ν = MΞ where the twisted cost
function Ξ is a solution of the fixed point problem:
Ξ = ΞMΞ . (3.25)
Prop. 3.9 or 3.10 do not say anything about the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibria. Such information requires the analysis of the fixed point equations (3.24) or
(3.25), and necessitates specific assumptions on the trading interaction potential φ. This
analysis is outside the scope of the present work. We now provide a game theoretical
interpretation of the equilibria in the next section.
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3.3 Game theoretical interpretation
In this section, we show that the equilibria MΞ are Nash equilibria [25] for the mean-field
game (also known as non-cooperative non-atomic anonymous game with a continuum of
players [8]) associated to the cost function µν(y) given by (3.7). For such a game, a Nash
equilibrium measure νNE ∈ P(R+) is such that [8] (see also [5, 6]) there exists a constant
K and {
µνNE(y) = K ∀y ∈ Supp(νNE),
µνNE(y) ≥ K ∀y ∈ R+ ,
(3.26)
where Supp(νNE) denotes the support of νNE. This definition is equivalent to the following
statement [8]:
∫
y∈R+
µνNE(y) νNE(y) dy = inf
ν∈Pac(R+)
∫
y∈R+
µνNE(y) ν(y) dy. (3.27)
Eq. (3.27) is called the ’mean-field’ equation. Now, we have the following
Theorem 3.11 Let ν ∈ Pac(R+). Then the two following statements are equivalent:
(i) ν is an equilibrium (3.24),
(ii) ν is a Nash equilibrium (3.26) for the Mean-Field game associated to the cost
function µν given by (3.7).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 3.5 of [12]. We reproduce it here for
the sake of completeness.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Let ν = MΞν be an equilibrium (3.24). Then, we have by (3.7):
µν(y) = −d lnZΞν = Constant, ∀y ∈ R+.
and hence, ν satisfies condition (3.26) characterizing Nash equilibria.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Let νNE be a Nash equilibrium (3.26). We show that Supp(νNE) = R+. Indeed,
by contradiction, suppose Supp(νNE)  R+. There exists y ∈ R+ such that νNE(y) = 0.
Then, because of the log inside (3.7) and the finiteness of ΞνNE(y) for 0 < y < ∞, we
have µνNE(y) = −∞ which is a contradiction to the second line of (3.26). Therefore, by
the first line of (3.26), µνNE is identically constant over the entire space R+. From the
expression of µνNE in (3.7), νNE is proportional to exp(−ΞνNE(y)/d), which means that it
is an equilibrium (3.24).
The mean-field model (3.3)-(3.5) can be recast as a transport equation as follows
∂tν + ∂y · (v ν) = 0, (3.28)
v = −∂yµν . (3.29)
It describes the bulk motion of agents which move in the direction of the steepest descent
towards the minimum of µν . When all agents have reached the minimum of µν , then µν
is a constant and describes a Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, in the proposed dynamics,
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the agents’ actions result in a motion in the steepest descent direction towards the Nash
equilibrium.
Let us now interpret the fixed point problems (3.24) or (3.25) in the framework of
this Nash equilibrium problem. Let first the agents be distributed according to the dis-
tribution ν. Each of the them constructs a strategy by forming the twisted cost function
Ξν calculated from ν through (3.6). This cost function enables each agent to enforce a
best-reply strategy and move downwards the gradient of µν until reaching its minimum.
By the discussion above, when all the agents have reached the minimum of µν , their dis-
tribution is given by MΞν . Now, this can only be an equilibrium if, when constructing a
new twisted cost function ΞMΞν based on this new distribution, we find the same twisted
cost function as before, i.e. Ξν . Indeed, otherwise, the new cost function will trigger a
new motion along the gradients of the augmented cost function µMΞν which will destroy
the equilibrium MΞν . Therefore, a condition for MΞ to be an equilibrium is that ΞMΞ = Ξ
which is (3.25). Within this condition, no agent can find a better strategy, since when
forming the twisted cost function associated to this distribution, he finds the same cost
as before which is already minimized.
The important conclusion of this discussion is that the fixed point problems (3.24) or
(3.25) express that the agents have found a Nash equilibrium associated to the augmented
cost function µν .
Remark 3.3 In [12], a variational structure for potential games [23]. is developed. A
variational structure supposes that there exists a functional U(ν) such that
Ξν(y) =
δU(ν)
δν
(y), ∀y ∈ R+,
where δU(ν)
δν
is the functional derivative of U defined by
∫
y∈R+
δU(ν)
δν
(y) (ϕ(y)− ν(y)) dy = lim
s→0+
1
s
(U(ν + s(ϕ− ν))− U(ν)),
for any test function ϕ(y) ∈ Pac(R+). The existence of such a functional gives a very
strong constraint on Ξ. In the present case, we have not been able to find such a functional
U(ν). It seems that the present model provides an example of Mean-Field Game with no
potential structure.
The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in the most general trading interaction
setting will be investigated in future work. We now examine the case of the quadratic
trading interaction setting of [7].
3.4 Quadratic trading interaction
In this case, we let φ(y) = |y|
2
2
. From (3.5), we have
∂yΦν(y) = κ
∫
y′∈R+
(y − y′) ν(y′) dy′ = κ(y −Υν), (3.30)
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where Υν is the mean wealth associated to the wealth distribution ν, given by:
Υν =
∫
y∈R+
y ν(y) dy. (3.31)
We see that the trading cost function Φν only depends on the mean wealth, i.e. the first
moment of the distribution ν, instead of depending on the whole functional shape of ν as
in the general trading interaction case treated so far. We will exploit this fact and express
all objects related to this interaction in terms of Υν only. On the other hand, this shows
that the quadratic trading interaction case is a degenerate case. Conclusions drawn from
this case might be non-generic and misleading.
The operator Q can be expressed as follows (which is similar to the Bouchaud &
Me´zart form [7]):
Q(ν)(y) = QΥν (ν)(y), (3.32)
where, for all Υ ∈ R+, we denote by QΥ(ν) the following linear operator:
QΥ(ν)(y) = ∂y
(
κ (y −Υ) ν + d ∂y(y2ν)
)
. (3.33)
From (3.6), (3.7), the twisted and augmented cost functions are given by:
Ξν(y) = Ξ˜Υν (y), µν(y) = Ξ˜Υν (y) + d ln ν, (3.34)
where, for all Υ ∈ R+, we denote by
Ξ˜Υ(y) = (κ+ 2d) ln y + κ
Υ
y
. (3.35)
In the remainder, we will omit the tilde on Ξ˜Υ when the context is clear.
The Gibbs measure MΥ associated with ΞΥ given by (3.35) through (3.8) is expressed
by
MΥ(y) =
1
ZΥ
1
y1+
κ+d
d
exp
(− κΥ
dy
)
, (3.36)
where ZΥ is given by:
ZΥ =
∫ ∞
0
1
y1+
κ+d
d
exp
(− κΥ
d y
)
dy.
It is well-defined for κ+ d > 0. We have
ZΥ =
Γ
(
κ+d
d
)
(
κΥ
d
)κ+d
d
,
where Γ is the Euler Gamma function.
The condition κ + d > 0 guarantees the integrability of MΥ when y → ∞. The
condition κ > 0 implies that MΥ(0) = 0 because of the exponential factor. We have
MΥ = gκ+d
d
,κΥ
d
,
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where gα,β is the inverse Gamma distribution
gα,β(y) =
βα
Γ(α)
1
y1+α
e−
β
y ,
with shape parameter α and scale parameter β. This distribution is also sometimes called
the scaled inverse chi-squared distribution. It is related to the Gamma distribution
γα,β(z) =
βα
Γ(α)
zα−1 e−βz, (3.37)
by the change of variables z = 1/y, i.e.
gα,β(y) dy = γα,β(z) dz. (3.38)
This distribution has been previously found in [7, 10, 13]. When y is large, the distribution
MΥ becomes the Pareto power law distribution [27], which has a very strong agreement
with economic data (see e.g. the review in [36]) and α is known as the Pareto index.
We note the important following consistency property, which is not a priori obvious:
Lemma 3.12 Let Υ ∈ R+ be given and let MΥ be the equilibrium (3.36). Then, the mean
wealth of MΥ exists and is given by:
ΥMΥ = Υ. (3.39)
Proof. We compute:
ΥMΥ =
∫ ∞
0
1
y
κ+d
d
exp
(− κΥ
dy
)
dy
∫ ∞
0
1
y1+
κ+d
d
exp
(− κΥ
dy
)
dy
. (3.40)
The assumption κ > 0 guarantees that the integrals at both the numerator and the
denominator of (3.40) converge. Then, by the change of variables z = κΥ
yd
in (3.40) and
integration by parts, it is straightforward to show that (3.39) holds.
In this case, Assumption 3.1 is a theorem. More precisely, we introduce the functional
setting:
XΥ =
{
u such that
∫
y∈R+
|u(y)|2MΥ(y) dy
y2
<∞
}
, (3.41)
HΥ =
{
u such that
∫
y∈R+
(|u(y)|2 + |y2 ∂yu(y)|2)MΥ(y) dy
y2
<∞
}
, (3.42)
endowed with the associated norms ‖u‖XΥ , and ‖u‖HΥ . We also define
HΥ0 = {u ∈ HΥ such that
∫
y∈R+
u(y)MΥ(y)
dy
y2
= 0}. (3.43)
Now, we have the following lemma, which directly follows from the corresponding modified
Poincare´ inequality for the Gamma distribution [3], formula (10) (see also [4, 19]):
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Lemma 3.13 There exists a constant C > 0 such that
|u|HΥ =
∫
y∈R+
|y ∂yu(y)|2MΥ(y) dy ≥ C‖u‖HΥ , ∀u ∈ HΥ0. (3.44)
The proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Then, Lemma 3.5 can be applied and we deduce the following lemma which lists all
the equilibria of the linear operator QΥ:
Proposition 3.14 The distribution ν is an equilibrium of QΥ if and only if ν = MΥ
where MΥ is given by (3.36).
We now turn to the equilibria of the nonlinear operator Q(ν) = QΥν (ν). They are
characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.15 ν is an equilibrium of Q if and only if there exists Υ ∈ R+ such that
ν = MΥ.
Proof. If ν is an equilibrium of Q, thanks to (3.32), it is an equilibrium of QΥ for a
certain value Υ. Theerfore, it is of the form ν = MΥ for this value of Υ, thanks to Prop.
3.14. Reciprocally, if ν = MΥ, then, ν is an equilibrium of QΥ by Prop. 3.14 and so,
satisfies QΥ(ν) = 0. But, thanks to Lemma 3.12, we have Υν = Υ. So, ν is a solution of
QΥν (ν) = 0, i.e. a solution of Q(ν) = 0 and is therefore an equilibrium.
Remark 3.4 In the present case, the fixed point equation (3.25) reduces to (3.39). Indeed,
since the twisted cost function only depends on the mean wealth Υ, Eq. (3.25) reduces to a
fixed point equation on the mean wealth. This equation is deduced from (3.25) by replacing
Ξ by Υ, i.e. it takes the form of Eq. (3.39). But precisely, Lemma 3.12 states that this
equation is satisfied for any value of Υ. Therefore, for a given value of the mean wealth,
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and the set of Nash equilibria is parametrized by
the mean wealth. In the case of more general trading interactions, the situation can be
much more complex. Therefore, the quadratic trading interaction case seems somehow
degenerate.
4 The inhomogeneous configuration case: derivation
of the macroscopic model
4.1 Framework
Now, we return to the model in the inhomogeneous configuration case (2.26)-(2.30) where
the positions of the agents in the economic configuration space is considered. The goal of
this section is to investigate the limit ε → 0 of this system. It will enable us to describe
the ensemble motion of the agents at large time scales, averaging out over their individual
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wealth variables. Therefore, we will introduce a suitable coarse-graining procedure. Tak-
ing advantage that at large times, individuals relax their wealth variables towards that
corresponding to a global Nash equilibrium given by (3.24), we use this equilibrium as a
prescription for the internal wealth variable distribution of the agents. In this section, we
provide the details of this coarse-graining process, known as the hydrodynamic limit in
kinetic theory. In a first part, we will consider general trading interaction potentials φ.
In the second part, we will focus on the particular case of quadratic trading interactions
and will recover a result of [13].
In order to simplify the computations, we make the following assumption, which is
not essential but simplifies the computations:
Assumption 4.1 We assume that the trading frequency ρξ(ρ) is a constant given by
ρξ(ρ) = κ. (4.1)
Under this assumption, the cost function Φν becomes independent of ρ and reduces
to (3.5), which, in the present spatially inhomogenous setting, is written:
Φνx,t(y) = κ
∫
y′∈R+
φ(y − y′) νx,t(y′) dy′, (4.2)
We write (2.26) as
∂tf
ε + ∂x(V (x, y)f
ε) =
1
ε
Q(f ε). (4.3)
The interaction operator Q is given by
Q(f) = QΞνx,t (νx, t), (4.4)
where, for Ξ ∈ C2(R+) and ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩ C2(R+), QΞ(ν) is given by (3.10)-(3.12), and
where Ξνx,t is related to Φνx,t by (3.6). We recall that νx, t and ρ(x, t) are given by (2.29),
(2.30).
Here again, we emphasize that (x, t) now refers to slow variables. The left-hand side
of (4.3) describes how the distribution of agents as a function of economic neighborhood
and time evolves. This evolution is driven by the fast, local evolution of this distribution
as a function of individual wealth y described by the right-hand side. The parameter
ε at the denominator highlights the fact that the exchanges of wealth occur on a much
faster time-scale than the evolution of the agents in the economic configuration variable.
The fast evolution of the wealth drives the system towards an equilibrium, i.e., a solution
of Q(f) = 0. Such a solution is referred to in physics as a Local Thermodynamical
Equilibrium (LTE). Below, we use the results of the previous section to show that, in this
case, the LTE’s are Nash equilibria given in Propositions 3.7 and 3.9.
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4.2 Local Thermodynamical Equilibria and conservations
Applying Proposition 3.9 to Q given by (4.4), we immediately get the
Corollary 4.1 Let f : (x, y, t) ∈ R × R+ × R+ 7→ f(x, y, t) ∈ R+ such that ∀(x, t) ∈
R×R+, the function y 7→ f(x, y, t) belongs to L1(R+)∩C2(R+). Then, the following two
statements are equivalent:
(i) Q(f) = 0 in the weak sense, where Q is the collision operator (4.4),
(ii) there exists ρ(x, t) > 0 and Ξx, t ∈ C2(R+) such that f is given by
f(x, y, t) = Feq, ρ(x,t),Ξx, t(y) := ρ(x, t)MΞx, t(y), ∀(x, y, t) ∈ R× R+ × R+, (4.5)
where, for any Ξ ∈ C2(R+), MΞ denotes the Gibbs distribution (3.8). Additionally, Ξx, t
must satisfy the fixed point equation which characterizes the equilibria, namely:
ΞMΞx, t = Ξx, t, ∀(x, t) ∈ R× R+. (4.6)
Remark 4.1 The functions Feq, ρ,Ξ are the LTE of our wealth distribution dynamical
model and they depend on the local density ρ and on the local twisted cost function Ξx, t
at given location x in economic configuration and given time t > 0.
We introduce the mean wealth Υ(x, t) associated with Feq, ρ,Ξ, defined by
Υ(x, t) =
∫
y∈R+
yMΞx,t(y) dy. (4.7)
Now, we can state a first result for the coarse-graining limit ε → 0 inside Eq. (4.3). We
have the
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that the solution f ε to (4.3) converges to a function f when ε→ 0
smoothly, which means in particular that all derivatives of f ε converge to the corresponding
derivative of f . Then, formally f is given by an LTE (4.5). The agent density ρ(x, t) and
wealth density (ρΥ)(x, t) satisfy the following conservation law:
∂tρ+∇x ·
(
ρ u(x; Ξx,t)
)
= 0, (4.8)
∂t(ρΥ) +∇x ·
(
ρ E(x; Ξx,t)
)
= 0, (4.9)
where, for any twisted cost function Ξ ∈ C2(R), we denote by
u(x; Ξ) =
∫
y∈R+
V (x, y)MΞ(y) dy, (4.10)
E(x; Ξ) =
∫
y∈R+
y V (x, y)MΞ(y) dy. (4.11)
The quantities u(x; Ξ) and E(x; Ξ) are respectively the agent’s and wealth average velocity
in configuration space for an equilibrium associated with the twisted cost function Ξ.
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Proof. From (4.3), we have that Q(f ε) = O(ε) and owing to the convergence assumptions
made on f ε, we have Q(f) = 0. Thanks to Corollary 4.1, f is of the form (4.5). Now,
observe that 1 and y are collisional invariant of Q, meaning that∫
y∈R+
Q(f)(y) dy = 0,
∫
y∈R+
Q(f)(y) y dy = 0, (4.12)
for all functions f(y). The first relation (4.12) easily comes upon integrating (3.3) with
respect to y and using Green’s formula (see also (3.19)). The second relation (4.12) is a
consequence of the evenness of the trading interaction potential φ (see Assumption 2.1).
Indeed, multiplying (3.3) by y, integrating it with respect to y and using Green’s formula
leads to: ∫
y∈R+
Q(f)(y) y dy = −
∫
y∈R+
∂yΦνx,t νx,t(y) dy
= −κ
∫
(y,y′)∈(R+)2
∂yφ(y − y′) νx,t(y) νx,t(y′) dy dy′ = 0, (4.13)
where we have used the fact that ∂yφ is odd and we recall that νx,t is related to f by (2.29).
Therefore, integrating (4.3) with respect to y leads to
∂tρ
ε +∇x · (ρεuε) = 0, (4.14)
where ρε and νεx,t(y) are obtained from f
ε through (2.30) and (2.29) respectively, and uε,
the mean velocity in configuration space associated to νεx,t, is defined by:
uε(x, t) =
∫
y∈R+
V (x, y) νεx,t(y) dy.
Similarly, multiplying (4.3) by y and integrating it with respect to y leads to
∂t(ρ
εΥε) +∇x · (ρεEε) = 0, (4.15)
with Υε the mean wealth of f ε, associated to νεx,t through (3.31) and Eε(x, t) the mean
wealth velocity in configuration space, defined by:
Eε(x, t) =
∫
y∈R+
y V (x, y) νεx,t(y) dy.
Then, taking the limit ε → 0 in (4.14), (4.15), and using that ρε → ρ, Υε → Υ and
νεx,t → MΞx,t , we get that uε(x, t) → u(x; Ξx,t) and Eε(x, t) → E(x; Ξx,t). Finally, the
limits of Eqs. (4.14), (4.15) are precisely Eqs. (4.8), (4.11).
Eq. (4.8) is a continuity equation which expresses how the number of agents in a given
domain of economic neighborhood changes in time. Indeed, let I = [a, b] be an interval
in economic neighborhood and denote by NI(t) the number of agents in this interval at
time t:
NI(t) =
∫
x∈I
ρ(x, t) dx.
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Then, integrating (4.8) over x ∈ I, and using an integration by parts, we get
dNI
dt
= −(ρu)(b) + (ρu)(a).
This equation expresses that NI varies in time due to the flux of agents leaving I through
point b and entering I through point a. Therefore, ρu is the flux of agents crossing an
arbitrary point and u(x; Ξx,t) is the average velocity of the agents in economic neighbor-
hood at this point. A similar interpretation is valid for Eq. (4.9), replacing agents by
wealth. Indeed, the average wealth is transported in economic neighborhood with velocity
E(x; Ξx,t) as the second term of Eq. (4.9) expresses.
In the present case of a general trading interaction potential φ, it is not clear if the
macroscopic equations (4.8), (4.9) form a closed system of equations. For this to be
true, we would need to be able to reconstruct Ξx,t from the knowledge of ρ(x, t) and
Υ(x, t). This is not possible in general, unless the fixed point equation (3.24) has a unique
solution among distributions ν of given mean wealth Υ. Such a uniqueness statement is
by no means obvious. There could exist a continuous family of solutions parametrized
by a parameter belonging to a d-dimensional manifold. In this case, we would need d
additional macroscopic equations to specify how these parameters evolve in configuration
space and time. The characterization of the manifold of equilibria strongly depends on
the assumptions made on the trading interaction potential φ and it it not possible to
make a general theory at this point.
Here as a matter of illustration, we investigate the quadratic trading interaction case
and show that the two conservation equations (4.8), (4.11) form a closed system of equa-
tions. This obviously follows from the fact that the twisted cost function Ξ is fully deter-
mined by the knowledge of the mean wealth Υ. By doing so, we recover the framework
of [13]. However, we note that this framework is very specific and cannot be generalized
simply to arbitrary trading interaction potentials.
4.3 Quadratic trading interaction case
4.3.1 LTE and conservations in the quadratic case
Here, we return to the quadratic trading interaction framework as developed in the ho-
mogeneous configuration case in section 3.4. We first specify the results of section 4.2 to
the present case.
Again, we make Assumption 4.1 for the sake of simplicity. We consider the spatially
inhomogeneous kinetic equation (4.3) where now, the collision operator Q is given by
Q(f) = QΥνx,t (νx, t), (4.16)
where, for Υ ∈ R+ and ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩ C2(R+), QΥ(ν) is given by (3.33), and where
Υν is the mean wealth of ν given by (3.31). We recall that νx, t and ρ(x, t) are given
by (2.29), (2.30).
The equilibria are given by the following corollary of Prop. 3.15:
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Corollary 4.3 Let f : (x, y, t) ∈ R × R+ × R+ 7→ f(x, y, t) ∈ R+ such that ∀(x, t) ∈
R×R+, the function y 7→ f(x, y, t) belongs to L1(R+)∩C2(R+). Then, the following two
statements are equivalent:
(i) Q(f) = 0 in the weak sense, where Q is the collision operator (4.16),
(ii) there exists ρ(x, t) > 0 and Υ(x, t) > 0 such that f is given by
f(x, y, t) = Feq, ρ(x,t),Υ(x,t)(y) := ρ(x, t)MΥ(x,t)(y), ∀(x, y, t) ∈ R× R+ × R+, (4.17)
where, for any Υ ∈ R+, MΥ denotes the inverse gamma distribution (3.36).
Now, in the coarse-graining limit ε → 0 of (4.3) we get the agent and wealth density
conservation equations, stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4 We consider the solution f ε to (4.3) supplemented with the collision op-
erator (4.16). We suppose that f ε converges to a function f when ε→ 0 smoothly, which
means in particular that all derivatives of f ε converge to the corresponding derivative of f .
Then, formally f is given by an LTE (4.17). The agent density ρ(x, t) and wealth density
(ρΥ)(x, t) satisfy the following conservation law:
∂tρ+∇x ·
(
ρ u(x; Υ(x, t))
)
= 0, (4.18)
∂t(ρΥ) +∇x ·
(
ρ E(x; Υ(x, t))) = 0, (4.19)
where, for any Υ ∈ R+, we denote by
u(x; Υ) =
∫
y∈R+
V (x, y)MΥ(y) dy, (4.20)
E(x; Υ) =
∫
y∈R+
y V (x, y)MΥ(y) dy. (4.21)
We see that system (4.18), (4.19) forms a closed system of equations. There are two
unknown scalars ρ(x, t) and Υ(x, t) and two scalar conservation equations to determine
them. This model describes the combined evolution of the density ρ of agents and their
average wealth Υ in economic neighborhood and time. It resembles a gas dynamic system.
It is readily checked that the model is strictly hyperbolic (and hence, well-posed), provided
the following condition is satisfied:
(
u(Υ)−Υu′(Υ) + E ′(Υ))2 > 4u2(Υ)(uE
)′
(Υ), ∀Υ ∈ R+,
where primes denote derivatives with respect to Υ. Specific expressions of u(Υ) and E(Υ)
will depend on the context.
This type of model has previously been derived in [13]. The derivation of [13] relies on
a moment method, where the zero-th and first order moments of the distribution function
with respect to the wealth variable are taken, and closure using the inverse gamma dis-
tribution. Here, we wish to show a bit more, namely that there are no other independent
conservation relation involved in the macroscopic system. If it were so, the limit sys-
tem would be determined by more equations than unknown functions parametrizing the
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equilibrium distribution. This would imply that the limit problem is ill-posed and would
indicate that the formal ε→ 0 limit cannot lead to a rigorous result. Here, we show that
the zero-th and first order moments of the distribution functions are the only conserved
quantities, indicating the consistency of the limit model and the possibility of converting
the present formal result into a rigorous one. Proving this amounts to showing that the
space of collision invariants is spanned by the functions 1 and y. This is performed in the
next section.
4.3.2 Collision Invariants
We recall the definition of a collision invariant (or ’CI’).
Definition 4.5 A function χ: y ∈ R+ → χ(y) ∈ R in C2(R+) is called a Collision
Invariant (CI) if and only∫
y∈R+
Q(ν)(y)χ(y) dy = 0, ∀ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩ C2(R+). (4.22)
We denote by C the set of CI. This is a vector space. As seen before, χ(y) = 1 and
χ(y) = y are CI and corresponds to the conservation of the number of agents and the
conservation of wealth through trading interactions. We prove that, in the quadratic
trading interaction case, C is actually the vector space spanned by these two functions,
i.e. the dimension of C is equal to 2. This means that there are no other conservation
relations involved in the macroscopic limit than the conservations of the agent and wealth
densities.
Proposition 4.6 We now suppose the additional condition κ > d. The set C of CI is the
two-dimensional vector space spanned by the functions 1 and y.
Proof. We first transform (4.22) into a variational formulation and then, apply Lemma
3.5. Let χ ∈ C. Eq. (4.22) is equivalently written:∫
y∈R+
QΥν (ν)(y)χ(y) dy = 0, ∀ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩ C2(R+). (4.23)
The difficulty is the nonlinearity induced by the fact that Υ appearing in Q is related to
ν by Υ = Υν . We first need to break this nonlinearity. For this purpose, let Y > 0 be
fixed. Obviously, (4.23) is equivalent to saying that for all Y ∈ R+, we have∫
y∈R+
QY (ν)(y)χ(y) dy = 0, ∀ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩ C2(R+) such that Υν = Y. (4.24)
We first fix Y ∈ R+ and look for all function χY such that (4.24) holds. Let us denote by
CY the space of such functions χY . It is also a vector space. Obviously from (4.24), we
have
C =
⋂
Y ∈R+
CY .
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Now, the constraint Υν = Y is a linear constraint on ν which can be written∫
y∈R+
ν(y) (y − Y ) dy = 0.
Therefore, χY ∈ CY if and only if the following implication holds for all ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩
C2(R+): ∫
y∈R+
ν(y) (y − Y ) dy = 0 =⇒
∫
y∈R+
QY (ν)(y)χY (y) dy = 0. (4.25)
Both expressions to the left and right hand sides of the arrow in (4.25) are linear forms
of ν. Therefore, by a classical duality argument, (4.25) is equivalent to the existence of a
real number c such that for all ν ∈ Pac(R+) ∩ C2(R+), we have:∫
y∈R+
QY (ν)(y)χY (y) dy = c
∫
y∈R+
ν(y) (y − Y ) dy. (4.26)
Now, we note that the operator QY is linear. Its L2 formal adjoint Q∗Y is well-defined and
(4.26) can be written
∫
y∈R+
ν(y)Q∗Y (χY )(y) dy = c
∫
y∈R+
ν(y) (y − Y ) dy. (4.27)
Since this equality is valid for all ν, it is equivalent to saying that
Q∗Y (χY )(y) = c(Y − y). (4.28)
Now, the derivation of the weak form of (4.28) is similar as in the proof of Lemma 3.5 (i).
We recall the definitions (3.41), (3.42) and (3.43) of XY ,HY ,HY 0. The weak form of (4.28)
consists in looking for χY ∈ HY such that:∫
y∈R+
∂yχY (y) ∂yσ(y) y
2MY (y) dy = c
∫
y∈R+
(y − Y ) σ(y)MY (y) dy, ∀σ ∈ HY , (4.29)
By an argument already used in the proof of Lemma 3.5 (ii), if c = 0, the only solutions
of problem (4.29) are the constants. Furthermore, by linearity, it is sufficient to look for
the solutions associated to c equal to a given non-zero constant. Here we choose c = κ
d
.
Besides, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
∫
y∈R+
(y − Y ) σ(y)MY (y) dy
≤
(∫
y∈R+
(y − Y )2 y2MY (y) dy
)1/2(∫
y∈R+
σ2(y)MY (y)
dy
y2
)1/2
.
Since σ ∈ XY , the right-hand side of (4.29) defines a bounded linear form if and only if∫
y∈R+
(y − Y )2 y2MY (y) dy <∞.
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This is indeed verified if the condition κ > d is satisfied. Additionally, thanks to (3.39),
the function y − Y satisfies the solvability condition (3.18). Therefore, applying Lemma
3.5 (iii), Problem (4.29) with c = κ
d
admits a unique solution belonging to HY 0 which we
denote by χ1Y . We have just proved that CY = Span{1, χ1Y }.
Now, we define
y0 =
∫
y∈R+
MY (y)
dy
y∫
y∈R+
MY (y)
dy
y2
.
The function y − y0 belongs to HY 0. Inserting y − y0 for χY into the left-hand side of
variational formulation (4.29), we get
∫
y∈R+
∂y(y − y0) ∂yσ(y) y2MY (y) dy =
∫
y∈R+
∂yσ(y) y
2MY (y) dy
= −
∫
y∈R+
σ(y) ∂y(y
2MY (y)) dy. (4.30)
But, by the definition of the equilibria MY , we have
κ(y − Y ) + d∂y(y2MY (y)) = 0.
Hence, (4.30) leads to:
∫
y∈R+
∂y(y − y0) ∂yσ(y) y2MY (y) dy = κ
d
∫
y∈R+
σ(y) (y − Y ) dy.
Therefore, by uniqueness of the solution of (4.29) in HY 0, we have (y−y0) = χ1Y (y). Since
y0 is a constant, we finally get that CY = Span{1, y}. We see that CY does not depend on
Y . Hence,
C =
⋂
Y ∈R+
CY = Span{1, y},
which is what needed to be proved.
5 Conclusion and perspectives
In this paper we have presented and analyzed a kinetic model of rational agents which
interact by exchanging wealth and besides, evolve slowly in an economic configuration
space as a result of the fast trading exchanges. Each agent bases its decisions on minimiz-
ing a cost functional. This results in a redistribution of wealth which drives the system
towards a Nash equilibrium. We have considered general cost functions while the liter-
ature is mostly concerned with quadratic cost functions. On the large scales, this gives
a hydrodynamic-like model for the agent and wealth densities, which leads to a closed
system in the case of a quadratic cost function. There are several interesting questions
left to be answered. The most important ones are the characterization of the number of
Nash equilibria and of their stability in the case of a non-quadratic cost function, and
the derivation of a closed system of hydrodynamic equations in this case. The existence
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of multiple equilibria are the indications of possible phase transitions. Such phase tran-
sitions could provide a paradigm for economic cycles and fast societal transitions which
appear when a new technology emerges.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 3.5
(i) Introducing the change of variables (3.17) into (3.15) and using Green’s formula, we
find (3.16). Green’s formula is applicable and the boundary terms disappear because of
the assumptions of smoothness made on f and g.
(ii) We just let σ = ϕ in (3.16).
(iii) Taking σ = Constant in (3.16), the left-hand side vanishes. Therefore, if (3.18) is
not satisfied, there cannot exist a solution. Supposing now that (3.18) is satisfied, we
can restrict the set of test functions σ to HΞ0 in the weak formulation (3.16). Indeed,
from σ ∈ HΞ0, we can construct an arbitrary test function in HΞ by simply adding a
constant. But, because (3.18) is satisfied, the weak formulation (3.16) is still true for this
test function. Now, because of the assumed Poincare´ inequality (3.14), the left-hand side
of (3.16) is a coercive bilinear form on HΞ0 while, because of the assumption that ψ ∈ XΞ,
the right-hand side is a continuous linear form on HΞ0. Therefore, Lax-Milgram’s theorem
applies and there exists a unique solution ϕ ∈ HΞ0 to problem (3.16). The most general
solution is of the form ϕ+ Constant because of point (ii). This ends the proof.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 3.13
Let v: z ∈ R+ 7→ v(z) ∈ R such that∫ ∞
0
(|v(z)|2 + |∂zv(z)|2) γα,β(z) dz <∞, (B.1)
where γα,β(z) is the gamma distribution defined at (3.37). Then, formula (10) of [3] states
that there exists a constant Cα,β > 0 such that
∫ ∞
0
|v(z)− v¯|2 γα,β(z) dz ≤ Cα,β
∫ ∞
0
|∂zv(z)|2 γα,β(z) dz, (B.2)
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where
v¯ =
∫ ∞
0
v(z) γα,β(z) dz. (B.3)
Then, we make the change of variables z = 1/y in (B.1), (B.2), (B.3). We denote by
u(y) = v(z) and use (3.38). We remark that ∂zv(z) = −y2∂yu(y). Therefore, we have,
denoting by Cα,β generic constants only depending only on α and β:
∫ ∞
0
|u(y)|2 gα,β(y) dy
y2
=
∫ ∞
0
|v(z)|2 z2 γα,β(z) dz
= Cα,β
∫ ∞
0
|v(z)|2 γα+2,β(z) dz,
and ∫ ∞
0
|y2 ∂yu(y)|2 gα,β(y) dy
y2
=
∫ ∞
0
|∂zv(z)|2 z2 γα,β(z) dz
= Cα,β
∫ ∞
0
|∂zv(z)|2 γα+2,β(z) dz,
and finally,
u¯ =
∫ ∞
0
u(y) gα,β(y)
dy
y2
=
∫ ∞
0
v(z) z2 γα,β(z) dz
= Cα,β
∫ ∞
0
v(z) γα+2,β(z) dz.
Now, letting (α, β) = (κ+d
d
, κΥ
d
), we notice that v satisfies (B.1) (with α shifted to α + 2)
if and only if u ∈ HΥ. Furthermore, v¯ = 0 if and only if u ∈ HΥ0. Now, the Poincare´
inequality (B.2) (with α shifted to α + 2) leads to (3.14).
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